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Wyoming v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017)
Jaclyn R. Van Natta
In Wyoming v. Zinke, the Bureau of Land Management attempted
to update a regulation governing hydraulic fracturing from the 1980s, but
oil and gas industry companies opposed, and brought suit. The district
court held in favor of the industry petitioners, and the Bureau of Land
Management and citizen group intervenors appealed. In the wake of
appeal, Donald J. Trump became President of the United States. The
administration change caused the Bureau of Land Management to alter its
position and align with the new administration. Secretary of the Interior,
Ryan Zinke, via executive order, began rescinding the new fracking
regulation, which rendered the issues prudentially unripe for review.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1940s, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has been a vital
resource to the oil and gas industry.1 Fracking is a technique that allows
producers to obtain large volumes of oil and natural gas.2 Currently, ninety
percent of fracking is hydraulic—a hybrid of horizontal drilling and
traditional fracking.3 Due to increased public concern over fracking
pollution, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) published proposed
Regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3 (“Fracking Regulation”) on March 11,
2012 to regulate fracking on “lands owned or held in trust by the United
States.”4 The Fracking Regulation significantly increased the cost of
drilling by requiring stricter well construction, testing, flowback
requirements, and disclosure of chemicals.5 The Fracking Regulation also
increased BLM’s oversight power.6
On May 20, 2015, the Independent Petroleum Association of
America and Western Energy Alliance (collectively “Industry
Petitioners”) challenged the legality of the Fracking Regulation under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) on two separate counts.7 Industry
Petitioners cited the arbitrary and capricious standard and asserted that no
statute gave the BLM authority to enforce the Fracking Regulation.8 The
States of Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, and the Ute Indian
Tribe joined the Industry Petitioners, and opposed the new regulation.9 A
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number of citizen groups intervened (“Citizen Group Intervenors”) in
support of BLM’s proposed regulation.10
The district court addressed the issues put forth by the Industry
Petitioners, supra, and held the BLM violated the APA and exceeded its
statutory authority.11 The BLM and Citizen Group Intervenors appealed.
However, while appeals were pending, Donald J. Trump became President
of the United States and subsequently directed the BLM to abrogate the
Fracking Regulation.12 The policy shift required the court to first address
the constitutional question of ripeness before it could reach the underlying
issues of the case.13
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Department of Interior (“DOI”) codified Fracking Regulation
30 C.F.R. Part 221 (“Predecessor Fracking Regulation”) in 1982.14 Under
the Predecessor Fracking Regulation, the oil and gas industry rarely sought
fracturing job approval, resulting in minimal BLM regulation.15 In 2005,
Congress amended the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”).16 The
amendment precluded all federal regulation of non-diesel fracking, which
effectively limited regulation of fracking to state power.17 Despite the
SDWA amendment—and due to increased public concern—the BLM
drafted Fracking Regulation 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3 in 2010, inter alia,
requiring disclosure of the effects of hydraulic fracking on underground
water sources.18 Due to the increased regulatory costs the Fracking
Regulation would have on the oil and gas industry, Industry Petitioners
objected, stating the BLM’s Fracking Regulation violated the APA and
lacked statutory power.19 On March 26, 2015, the BLM published its final
version of the Fracking Regulation, which would have gone into effect on
June 24, 2015. However, the district court halted the effective date,
pending the outcome of Industry Petitioners’ preliminary injunction
motions.20
The BLM and Citizen Group Intervenors appealed the district
court’s grant of preliminary injunction on September 30, 2015.21 On June
10.
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Id. (See 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C). Post SDWA amendment, the
statutory provisions of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, the Mineral
Leasing Act, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, and Indian Mineral Development Act
did not provide the BLM any statutory power to promulgate the Fracking
Regulation).
20.
Id. at 1138-39.
21.
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21, 2016, the district court entered judgment setting aside the Fracking
Regulation.22 In the wake of pending appeal, President Trump issued two
Executive Orders, the first in January 2017 and the second in March
2017.23 Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke (“Zinke”), proposed
rescission of the Fracking Regulation, and stated that the Fracking
Regulation “unnecessarily burden[ed] industry with compliance costs and
information requirements that [were] duplicative of regulatory programs
of many states and some tribes.”24
On September 21, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit asserted the issue at bar was greater than deciding
whether a statute existed “provid[ing] the BLM with authority to regulate
fracking[,]”25 but rather rested upon the question of whether the court
should proceed on the merits due to ripeness concerns.26
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit first addressed the validity of the procedural process by evaluating
whether the ripeness doctrine justified its denial to exercise Article III
power.27 Prudential ripeness was evaluated by dissecting two elements: (1)
fitness for review by judicial decision and (2) the hardship parties would
face if the court withheld judicial review.28 Second, the court decided
whether dismissal or abatement of the appeals was proper.29 Finally, the
court decided if vacatur was appropriate.30
A. Prudential Ripeness
The court explained that under the prudential ripeness doctrine a
federal court has jurisdiction, but exercise of jurisdiction would be
unwise.31 Prudential ripeness was evaluated by assessing fitness of the
issues for judicial review as well as hardship the parties would recognize
in the absence of a court decision.32

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1146.
Id.
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Fitness for Review

The United States Supreme Court established three factors to
evaluate whether an issue was fit for review.33 These factors include: (1)
whether the issues on appeal were purely legal, (2) whether the dispute in
question was a final agency decision, and (3) whether further factual
development was needed for the court to make a proper decision.34 The
tenth circuit recognized two additional factors; (4) whether administrative
action would be inappropriately impeded by the court’s decision, and (5)
whether further factual development of the issues in question would be
beneficial to the court.35
Factors one and two were met because the issue was purely legal
and the agency’s decision was final.36 However, factors three, four, and
five were not met. Since the Fracking Regulation was in the process of
being rescinded, invalidation of the Fracking Regulation by the district
court was too dependent on future contingent factors.37 Factor four was
not met because the BLM was still in the process of rescinding all or part
of the Fracking Regulation and it would have been inappropriate for the
court to interfere.38 Finally, factor five was not met because the court
determined an unusual circumstance existed where “it was better to wait
until the agency’s regulatory revision was complete.”39
2. Hardship to the Parties of Withholding Review
Under the hardship analysis, the court focused on harm caused by
the challenged Fracking Regulation. The court continued its prudential
ripeness evaluation by determining whether withholding review would
cause “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind”40 to the Citizen Group
Intervenors and the BLM.41 To determine hardship, the court assessed
financial repercussions and innocence of the defendants’ actions regarding
plaintiffs’ interests.42
The court held that withholding review would not cause
hardship—financial or otherwise—upon the parties seeking judicial
review.43 Withholding judicial review caused the Citizen Group
Intervenors no further harm than already existed.44 However, where
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id. at 1142 (See Ferrell-Cooper Min. Co. v. United States Dept. of
the Int., 728 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2013).
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withholding review would neither improve nor worsen conditions for
Citizen Group Intervenors, withholding review proved more beneficial for
the BLM.45 When the BLM changed position under the Trump
Administration, the BLM’s desire to repeal the Fracking Regulation made
withholding judicial review favorable.46 Ultimately, because the court held
the hardships unsubstantial and the overall issues unfit for judicial review,
the case was not ripe for review.47
B. Dismissal of Appeal
The court ultimately held that dismissal of appeal was more
favorable than abatement.48 The court’s decision was partially a timing
concern.49 The court would have likely abated the appeal for a short,
definite period; however, no time limit existed here.50 Further, it was not
within an Article III court’s role “to supervise or monitor the rulemaking
efforts of an Article II agency.”51 Ultimately, because the appeal
challenged the district court’s final judgment instead of a direct judicial
review of the BLM’s Fracking Regulation, dismissal of appeal was
favorable.52 Due to the unripe and undeveloped record, coupled with the
uncertain future of the Fracking Regulation, dismissal rather than
abatement was appropriate.53
C. Vacatur of District Court’s Order
The next issue the court addressed was whether vacatur of the
district court’s order was appropriate. Prior precedent said that vacatur was
generally appropriate when an appeal was moot, and its mootness was not
caused by the party that sought vacatur.54 The only party seeking vacatur
in the case at hand was the Conservation Group Intervenors, not Zinke or
the BLM.55 Further, the court used hypothetical rationalization to
determine that even if Zinke and the BLM had sought vacatur, evading
review was not their motive.56 Therefore, the court held that vacatur was
appropriate.57 The court also held that dismissal of the underlying action
without prejudice was appropriate because the district court could do no
more with the prudentially unripe issues than the appellate court.58
45.
46.
47.
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D. Judge Hartz’s Dissent
While agreeing with the majority’s opinion that it would be a
waste of judicial resources to determine whether the district court erred in
invalidating the Fracking Regulation, Judge Hartz argued that the majority
erred on two counts.59 Judge Hartz argued that the majority first erred
when it vacated the district court’s order because the appellate court lacked
sufficient information to make such a determination.60 Second, Judge
Hartz argued that the majority erred when it failed to affirm a partial
injunction on behalf of the Ute Tribe.61 Because the Ute Tribe’s issues
went unchallenged by opposing parties, Judge Hartz asserted that a partial
injunction would have resolved the matter and would not have wasted any
judicial resources.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Wyoming v. Zinke illustrates that the legal basis for determining
ripeness is well established: ripeness is evaluated by assessing fitness of
the issues for judicial review as well as hardship the parties would
recognize in the absence of a court decision. Nevertheless, if a contingent
event exists that has yet to occur, such as the BLM’s proposed rescission
of the Fracking Regulation, a court may, under Article III of the
Constitution, determine that a claim is not ripe for adjudication. Since it is
impossible to foresee all possible future contingent events, a natural
conflict arises. Waiting for all future contingencies to be resolved would
invariably result in judicial paralysis; however, the rescission of the
Fracking Regulation by the new administration and Secretary of the
Interior rendered a prudentially ripe case into an unripe one. Here, the
court could not hold whether the BLM’s rescission of the Fracking
Regulation was arbitrary and capricious because the contingent event—
the BLM’s rescission of the Fracking Regulation—was possible, but had
not yet occurred. Rendering further litigation before the BLM actually
rescinded the Fracking Regulation would have been a waste of judicial
resources.
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